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Abstract
Macroeconomic performance in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will be impaired
if macroeconomic shocks are largely asymmetric, fiscal policy flexibility is limited, goods markets
adjust sluggishly, labour mobility is low and automatic stabilization from federal taxes and
government spending is low like in the EU currently. This paper addresses the question whether
a system of fiscal transfers to stabilize differences in national business cycles can improve the
overall macroeconomic performance in the monetary union.
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Introduction
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is likely to induce static and dynamic efficiency gains
for the participating countries. The EC Commission (1990) studied in detail the possible gains
from EMU in its "One Market, One Money" study. On the other hand, in the EMU, when
completed, national policymakers are limited in their ability to actively stabilize output fluctuations
in their economies induced by macroeconomic shocks. A monetary union implies that individual
monetary policy is replaced by the common monetary policy of the ECB. Common monetary
policy can be directed to stabilize symmetric, that is, EMU-wide shocks but can not be directed
at stabilizing asymmetric, that is, country specific shocks. In particular, EMU implies the loss
of the possibility to adjust the nominal exchange rate in case members experience asymmetric
shocks. Loss of the exchange rate instrument as a shock absorber is potentially harmful if the
countries that join the EMU do not constitute an ’optimal currency area’.
Countries are less likely to form an optimal currency area if macroeconomic shocks
are predominantly asymmetric, nominal rigidities prevail in the short run, labour mobility is
low and automatic stabilization from federal taxes and government spending is low. A considerable
empirical literature on the degree to which macroeconomic shocks in the EU are predominantly
symmetric or asymmetric, exists currently. Studies by Weber (1991), Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993), Bayoumi and Prassad (1995) and Christodoulakis, Dimelis and Kollintzas (1995) suggest
that asymmetric shocks are fairly important in most countries of the European Union (EU).
Decressin and Fatas (1995) analyse labour mobility in the US and the EU and find evidence
that labour mobility is considerably smaller in the EU than in the US. Finally, a number of
studies analysed the automatic stabilization from federal taxes and government spending. Sachs
and Sala-i-Martin (1991), von Hagen (1991) and Goodhart and Smith (1993) show that this
automatic stabilization is considerable in mature federations like the U.S. and Canada. Because
of the current small size of the federal EU budget (about 1.3% of EU GDP), such automatic
stabilization from federal taxes and government spending is currently fairly small in the EU.
The significance of asymmetric shocks, limited labour mobility and low automatic stabilization
from federal taxes and government expenditures cast doubts whether the EU is actually an optimal
currency area.
EMU, therefore, is likely to shoulder the national fiscal authorities with a higher adjustment
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burden from stabilizing output fluctuations. The scope for national fiscal policies to stabilize
business cycle fluctuations will be limited in the EMU, however, if rigid fiscal stringency and
convergence criteria are imposed. Moreover, the increasing integration of goods, labour and
capital markets makes tax bases more mobile w.r.t. increases in the tax rates and increases the
spillovers in case of uncoordinated fiscal policies.
Hughes Hallett and Vines (1993) compare economic performance of EMU with a regime
of floating exchange rates, using simulation tools. It is pointed out that an EMU, compared
to flexible exchange rates, performs poorly when hit by asymmetric shocks, featuring an
independent ECB and low fiscal policy flexibility and lacking fiscal coordination. Hougaard
Jensen and Jensen (1995) analyse the costs in terms of foregone output from complying with
the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty for a small EU country.
This paper focuses on stabilization policies in an EMU confronted with symmetric and
asymmetric shocks. We consider a system of fiscal transfers that aims at stabilizing asymmetric
shocks in the EMU. In case of asymmetric shocks, such a transfer system might act as a substitute
for the shock-absorbing capacity of exchange rate realignments like in the EMS and for the
automatic stabilizing role of federal government spending and taxation that occurs in mature
fiscal federations. It is shown how such a European System of Fiscal Transfers (EFTS) can
increase macroeconomic efficiency in the monetary union by providing the participating countries
cushion against asymmetric shocks. Such a transfer system was advocated by van der Ploeg
(1991) who suggested to supplement the Maastricht Treaty on EMU with an EFTS aiming at
counteracting the consequences of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in a monetary union.
While some work has been developed on such an EFTS, notably by Italianer and van Heukelen
(1993) and von Hagen and Hammond (1995), the full implications of such a system have remained
largely unexplored.
Section 2 introduces a stylized two-country EMU model that will serve as our analytical
device. A system of fiscal transfers that aims at stabilizing differences in business cycle fluctuations
in the EU is proposed. Section 3 solves the model and derives its analytical properties. In section
4 numerical simulation of the model is used to study the dynamic adjustment in the EMU after
symmetric and asymmetric output shocks.
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5.2 A two-Country EMU model
Consider an EMU that consists of two countries. Assume that the economies of both countries
is given as follows,
Table 1
A two-Country EMU Model
Country 1 Country 2
wherey(t) denotes real output at timet, c(t) competitiveness of country 1 vis-à-vis country 2,
m(t) nominal money balances,p(t) the domestic output price level,pc(t) the consumer price
level andw(t) the nominal wage.i(t) andr(t) are the nominal and real interest rates.s(t) is an
index of the fiscal stance. The variables of the second country are indicated with an asterisk.
Variables are in logarithms and defined as deviations from their long term non inflationary,
balanced growth path2. The policy reaction functions that are given by (9)-(11) and explained
later on, close the model. To solve the model later on in an insightful manner it is assumed
2 See OECD (1995) for recent estimates of the NAIRU in the EU. Jaeger and Parkinson (1994) investigate
the presence of “hysteresis” in unemployment due to interaction between the NAIRU and cyclical unemployment.
The European unemployment is to a considerable extent a structural unemployment problem rather than the cyclical
unemployment that we consider here. See EC Commission (1995) for the breakdown of European unemployment
into structural and cyclical parts. The OECD (1994) Jobs Study analyzes the unemployment problem in the OECD
countries in great detail.
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that the countries do not differ w.r.t. the structural parameters that feature in (1)-(9).
(1) gives aggregate demand as a function of competitiveness, the real interest rate, foreign
output, fiscal policy and demand shocks that hit the economy.υ(t) is an aggregate demand shock
that hits the economy: it impacts the economy att=0, after which it decays exponentially:
υ(t)≡υ(0)e−ρt. ρ measures how long the shock impacts upon the economy. Ifρ equals zero, the
shock is permanent while ifρ is positive, the shock has some persistence but dies out gradually.
In the limiting case whereρ goes to infinity, the shock dies out instantaneously.
The demand for the common currency is given by (2). The EU-wide nominal interest
rate,i(t), clears the European money market. The supply of the common currency is controlled
by the ECB. Monetary policy of the ECB and its impact on macroeconomic performance is
considered in the next section. (3) defines the competitiveness of country 1 vis-à-vis country
2 as the difference of output prices3. (4) and (5) define the nominal interest rate and the consumer
price level which is a weighted average of the price level of domestic and foreign goods. The
fiscal stance (6) is defined as the real fiscal deficit,f(t), plus the net real fiscal transfer from
country 2 to country 1,n(t), as a consequence of the EFTS.
(7) and (8) describe the price and wage formation process in the presence of staggered
price and wage contracts of the type introduced by Taylor (1980a) and Calvo (1983). In case
of staggered contracts only a fraction,δ, of all nominal contracts are renewed in a period. The
average length of a contract, therefore, equals 1/δ. (7) determines the price level as a weighted
average of all outstanding wage contracts, implying that the price level is a predetermined variable
and the economy displays Keynesian price-stickiness in the short run. Differentiating w.r.t. time
gives the rate of inflation as a function of the real wage4. Wages in (8) equal the weighted
3 With flexible exchange rates competitiveness equals the real exchange rate which is defined asc≡e(t)+p*(t)−p(t)
in whiche(t) denotes the nominal exchange rate between country 1 and 2. Normalising, the final conversion rate,
E(t), to 1 implies that the real exchange rate,c(t)=p*(t)−p(t), sincee(t)=ln(E(t))=0, in that case. The choice of the
final conversion rates of national currencies to the new common currenc is by no means a trivial issue in practice,
as the analysis of Giovannini (1992) shows.
4 Differentiating (7) and (8) w.r.t. time gives:
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average of expected future prices and excess demand. Nominal wages are forward looking and
changes instantaneously upon the arrival of new information.Et denotes the expectations operator.
Since in this analysis output shocks are deterministic rather than stochastic, the assumption
of rational expectations of the wage setters implies perfect foresight and we can disregard the
expectations operator.
Staggered wage and price setting gives rise to nominal rigidities in the economy and
unemployment persistence if the economy is hit by a negative output shock. From a policy
perspective, the nominal rigidities create a Phillips curve alike trade-off between price and output
stability, in the short run5. δ reflects the institutional rigidities that limit the adjustment of
prices in goods and labour markets. A higher value ofδ implies that a higher fraction of outstanding
wage contract renews instantaneously. In that case, the higher price and wage flexibility dampens
business cycle fluctuations6. Note, finally, that the forward-looking character of nominal wages
implies that (anticipated) macroeconomic policies affect the behaviour of wages by altering
the expectations on future prices and excess demand.
The analysis abstains from modelling the interaction of the EU and the rest of the world
explicitly and treats the EU as a more or less closed economy. To some extent this simplification
might be defended by the empirical observation that in case of most EU countries intra-EU
trade dominates extra-EU trade to a large extent7. The impact of changes in the world economy
on the EU might take the form of an output shockυi(t) in this analysis. A decline in
competitiveness of the EU economy in world trade then might be represented as a negative
output shock. See the EC Commission (1990), Chapter 6 and Kenen (1993) on the external
dimensions and implications of EMU.
Throughout the analysis we will assume that the structural model parameters coincide
5 See Taylor (1980b) for an empirical analysis of staggered contracts and the output inflation trade-off.
6 The EC Commission (1990) recognizes the importance of a higher degree of price and wage flexibility: "(..)
it is worth mentioning here that wage-price flexibility remains the basic adjustment channel as a substitute for
the nominal exchange rate. (..) However, in so far as nominal rigidities hamper market adjustments, fiscal policy
measures can alleviate temporary country-specific disequilibria.This is indeed the traditional role of fiscal policy
as a tool for stabilization." (p.102)
7 See van Aarle (1996) for an empirical analysis of intra-EU trade and foreign direct investment. It is found
that in 1980 55.70% of total exports of the EU 12 countries has other countries in the EU 12 as destination. In
1994 this number had increased to 63.34%, indicating at increasing integration of goods markets in the EU.
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in both countries and that the countries are of equal size, simplifying assumptions that are useful
in deriving macroeconomic equilibrium of the two-country EMU8. We assume, furthermore,
that national fiscal policies are aimed at stabilizing national business cycle fluctuations, apart
from an exogenous component,f:
(9) implies that the fiscal deficit is increased if the economy is in recession and decreased if
(9a)
(9b)
output is above the targeted level of output,y.viz. y*. Fiscal policies affect the economy because
of their influence on aggregate demand (1).
Consider next the introduction of a system of fiscal transfers (EFTS) that is designed
to alleviate the adjustment burden of asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. Its basic working
is summarized as follows by van der Ploeg (1991), p. 144:
"The task of the EFTS is to make exchange-rate changes unnecessary by transferring
income from one country to another country when there are such shifts in preferences
[i.e. asymmetric shocks]. In practice, the scheme operates by transferring income from
individuals of one nation to individuals of another nation and replaces, to a certain
extent, the national unemployment compensation schemes. One could envisage a
Community-wide tax, which in itself would act as an automatic stabiliser, whose proceeds
are used to finance a Community-wide unemployment compensation scheme. It is crucial
that such a version of the EFTS is budget-neutral. (..) It is a pity that the Delors report
does not contain any recommendations for the establishment of a EFTS, because without
it regional imbalances induced by shifts in preferences may persist."
von Hagen and Hammond (1995) construct an insurance based system of fiscal transfers
and investigate a number of desirable properties of such a system. The stabilization scheme
8 If both countries differ in their structural parameters the adjustment processes in both economies will differ
even when hit by the same symmetric macroeconomic shock. In that case it becomes difficult, if not impossible,
to determine how much of the outcomes are due to the fact that countries differ in their structural parameters and
how much is due to the symmetric and asymmetric macroeconomic shocks themselves.
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considered in this paper is slightly different from the system of von Hagen and Hammond (1995):
it acts as an automatic output stabilizer rather than directly offsetting asymmetric shocks like
in von Hagen and Hammond9. More specifically, it automatically transfers resources from
countries experiencing a boom to countries that suffer from recession:
The transfer system aims at stabilizing the divergence in the business cycles of both countries
(10)
and does not affect the business cycle of the aggregate EU economy that is only affected by
ECB monetary policy and average fiscal policy in the EU10. (10) has the considerable advantage
for the policymakers that there is no need to estimate the actual size of the asymmetric
macroeconomic shocks. A disadvantage in practice could be that countries might have a strategic
incentive to reduce their own stabilization effort in the knowledge that this lack of activism -
implying a low value ofχ- will be partly compensated by higher fiscal transfers from the EFTS.
In our analysis we will abstract from such strategic considerations.
5.3 EMU Averages and Differences
To solve the model we use the Aoki factorization of the variables into averages and differences.
Assuming both countries to be of equal size, averages of a variable are defined as
xA(t)=½(x(t)+x*( t)) and differences asxD(t)=x(t)−x*( t). The individual country variables,
consequently, are defined asx(t)=xA(t)+½xD(t) andx*(t)=xA(t)−½xD(t). This method has the advantage
that dynamics are decomposed into two independent dynamic sub-systems: an average system
that gives the dynamics of the aggregate EU economy and a difference system that describes
differences between the two countries. Thus, the average system is particularly suited to study
9 In the context of our two-country EMU model, the transfer system of von Hagen and Hammond might be
defined as: , implying that a negative asymmetric supply shock in country 1, i.e.υD(t)<0, will
be counteracted by an automatic fiscal transfer from country 2 to country 1.
10 Note that the transfer system aims at stabilization rather than redistribution since output is defined in terms
of deviations from a long-run balanced growth equilibrium. Redistribution essentially aims at reducing disparities
in long-run equilibrium output (per capita). On allocational and redistributive dimensions of fiscal transfers in
the EU see in particular the EC Commission (1993).
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macroeconomic variables at the level of the aggregate EU economy, whereas the difference
system is suited to address issues of macroeconomic convergence between both parts of the
EU. Moreover, it has the nice property that macroeconomic shocks are decomposed into the
part that is completely symmetric, the shocks found in the average system, and a part that is
completely asymmetric, the shocks found in the difference system.
The (average) money supply in the monetary union,mA(t), is controlled by the European
Central Bank. The transmission channel of ECB monetary policy is the EU wide interest rate:
expansionary monetary policy induces a lower nominal interest rate to restore money market
equilibrium (2). Since prices are sticky in the short run, the decrease of the nominal interest
rate implies a decrease in the real interest rate which boosts output (1) in the short run. We
assume that monetary policy of the ECB is also set according to a linear feedback rule:
wheremA denotes some exogenous, possibly zero money supply target. (11) implies that the
(11)
money supply is expanded if output is below the targeted level of output,yA. The resulting
decrease in nominal and real interest rates boosts output in the short run.
ζ could be interpreted as a measure of conservativeness and independence of the ECB:
a value ofζ of zero would amount to an ultra conservative/independent ECB that only sticks
to its monetary target under all circumstances. A more conservative ECB implies that the fiscal
authorities, however, are facing a higher adjustment burden if symmetric shocks hit the EU
economy. A combination of a conservative ECB and strict fiscal stringency criteria, implying
low values ofζ andχ leaves the EU economy without effective automatic stabilization if symmetric
shocks occur. This will lead to suboptimal average economic performance, in particular if nominal
rigidities are considerable in the short run. Prevalence of the price stability objective in ECB
monetary policy is proclaimed in the Maastricht Treaty although monetary policies are allowed
to foster real economic performance, as long as it does not interfere with the price stability
objective. A strict interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty would amount to a zero or at least
small value of the feedback parametersζ andχ. Given the stabilizing impact of ECB monetary
policy on EU aggregate output, at least in the short run because of the nominal rigidities, it
cannot be ruled out that in practice the ECB will pursue policies that are geared to stabilize
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to some extent fluctuations of the real aggregate EU economy. In that caseζ is larger than zero11.
We can distinguish two alternative institutional settings of EMU: (i) ifζ=χ=ξ=0, there
is no automatic stabilization from ECB monetary policy, national fiscal policies or an EFTS.
This regime might be interpreted as the regime envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty, stressing
the dedication of the ECB to price stability, the need for fiscal stringency and the absence of
fiscal bail-out of individual countries by fiscal transfers. (ii) a regime withζ,χ,ξ>0 that recognizes
the inefficiencies that can arise in a monetary union with the aforementioned policy assignment
if macroeconomic shocks are predominantly asymmetric, labour mobility, price and wage flexibility
are low and if there is little automatic stabilization from federal expenditures and taxation. Table
2 provides the average and difference systems that can be derived from (1)-(11).
Table 2
Average and Difference Systems of the two-Country EMU Model
Average system Difference system
11 While certainly interesting because of the interdependencies and externalities in the EMU, the current analysis
does not consider the strategic interaction that might occur between the ECB and national fiscal authorities. It
is clear that coordination of fiscal policies by both countries or even coordination of monetary and fiscal policies
can be helpful in alleviating the adjustment from symmetric and asymmetric shocks in the EMU. Indeed, the EC
Commission (1990) considers coordination, with autonomy and discipline the three main components of the budgetary
regime in the EMU (p. 113).
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The average and difference systems provide a good insight into the working of the EU aggregate
economy and factors that create divergences between the two different countries. Intra-EU imports
transmit fluctuations in output, as given by (1), in one part of the EU to the other part with
a propensityσ. Intra-EU trade, therefore, tends to amplify output fluctuations in the average
system and to reduce output fluctuations in the difference system. The relative competitiveness
of country 1 relative to country 2, as defined in (3) does not affect average output but has a
strong distributional impact. Similarly, the EFTS, defined in (10), does not affect average fiscal
stances in (6) but impacts on the difference in fiscal stance and by that on difference output.
From (1)-(7) and (9)-(11) we can write output in the average and difference systems
as functions of the price level, wages, structural and policy parameters and output shocks:
where∆A≡1+γ(κ+ζ)/λ−σ+ηχ and∆D≡1+σ+η(χ+2ξ). Substituting (12) into (8) gives two dynamic
(12)
systems of the price level and the wage rate, the average and difference system:
Ai, bi, υi(t) are found in the Appendix A in (A.6) and (A.11).
(13)
The dynamic systems in (13) contain a backward-looking variable, the price levelpi(t)
and a forward-looking variable, the wage rate,wi(t). Saddlepoint stability, therefore, requires
A to have a positive and a negative eigenvalue12. A necessary and sufficient condition for
(13) to display saddlepoint stability is that the determinant ofAi, which equals the product of
the eigenvalues, is negative. We can write the adjustment of the dynamic system towards its
12 The eigenvalues are given by: whereTrace(AA)=−νγδ2/∆A,
Trace(AD)=−νγδ2(2µ−1)/∆D, Det(AA)=−νγδ2/λ∆A andDet(AD)=−2ανδ2/∆D The stable, negative eigenvalue,hi, measures
the adjustment speed towards steady state: the adjustment speed, −hi, of the dynamic systems is defined as the
absolute value of the stable eigenvalue ofA. The adjustment of the system towards steady-state is monotonic if
the discriminantDi=Trace(Ai))
2 −4Det(Ai) is positive and oscillatory if it is negative.
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steady-state A in Figure 1 as:
wherehi equals the stable eigenvalue ofAi. Steady-state average prices and wages equal:
(14)
The initial value of the price level is given because the price level is a predetermined variable.
(15)
The initial value of the forward-looking nominal wage follows from the condition that wages
adjust att=0 such as to place the dynamic system on its unique saddlepoint stable trajectory
SS. Appendix A derives the unique initial valueswi(0) that satisfy this condition. It is shown
that the unique initial level of the average and difference wage consistent with long-run convergence
to the steady-state equals:
in whichzi denotes the unstable eigenvalue ofAi. Figure 1 gives the phase diagram that pictures
(16)
the dynamics of the dynamics average and difference systems (13).
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Figure 1 Phase Diagram of the (wi t),pi(t)) System
The forward-looking wage rate displays a similar "overshooting" property as the exchange
rate in the Dornbusch (1976) model: the overshooting of the wage rate allows the labour market
to clear in the short run in the presence of price rigidities. An increase att=0 of the policy
targetsfi or yi e.g. or an unanticipated permanent positive output shockυi(0) imply that the
ẇi=0 locus shifts upward to the neẇi
’ =0 locus in Figure 2. The wage rate jumps upwards
from A to B on the new stable branch of the dynamic system. From B the system gradually
converges to the new steady-state A . The initial wage rate overshoots its new long-run equilibrium
value and during the adjustment process, wage rates decline and prices increase.
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Figure 2 Dynamic Adjustment of Wages and Prices
Because of the nominal rigidities in the short run implied by the staggered price and
wage contracts, the average system displays Keynesian features during the adjustment phase:
a negative symmetric shock induces a drop of output which, however, can be counteracted by
automatic stabilization from monetary and fiscal policy. In the long run, on the other hand,
the model displays neoclassical features with full adjustment of price and wages to ensure that
output returns at its long run (non-inflationary) equilibrium level, which itself is independent
of monetary and fiscal policy. The case for active fiscal stabilization in the EMU of symmetric
shocks, becomes more pressing, if the symmetric shock becomes more prolonged, i.e. ifρ gets
smaller and if the degree of price rigidity in the short run increases, i.eδ is smaller.
Asymmetric shocks induce a similar adjustment in wages, prices and output in the difference
system. Also the need to stabilize asymmetric shocks gets more pressing if the shocks have
considerable persistence and if price stickiness is high, i.e. ifρ andδ are small. Both fiscal
flexibility and the EFTS enable to smooth output fluctuations of output in the difference system
when EMU is hit by asymmetric shocks. Fiscal flexibility, though, causes higher steady-state
differences in the fiscal deficit whereas EFTS fosters fiscal convergence in the long run as it
partly redistributes the adjustment burden from asymmetric shocks from the ’unfortunate’ to
the ’fortunate part’ of the EU.
We summarize these possibilities of automatic stabilization of the average and difference
systems in the following proposition:
-14-
Proposition 1
(a) Fiscal and monetary flexibility smoothen fluctuations in average output induced by symmetric
shocks. (b) Fiscal flexibility and the EFTS smoothen fluctuations in difference output induced
by asymmetric shocks. (c) In that case the EFTS contributes to smoothen differences in the
fiscal deficit whereas fiscal flexibility increases the divergence in fiscal deficits.
Proof:
A higher degree of fiscal or monetary flexibility, i.e. a higher value ofχ or ζ, increases the
value of zA, the unstable eigenvalue of the average system, if
and increases∆A. This implies that the initial jump in the average wage rate after a symmetric
shock,υA(0), that is necessary to bring the economy on the new saddlepath is smaller. This
jump is derived in the appendix as (A.10). From (12) it follows that it also reduces the initial
decline in average output. This results in (a). A higher degree of fiscal flexibility or stabilization
from the EFTS, i.e. a higher value ofχ or ξ, increases the value ofzD, the unstable eigenvalue,
of the difference system if , and increases∆D.
This implies that the initial jump in the difference wage rate,wD(0), after an asymmetric shock,
υD(0), that is necessary to bring the economy on the new saddlepath is smaller. This jump is
derived in the appendix as (A.15). From (12) it follows that it also reduces the initial decline
in difference output. This results in (b). Introducing the EFTS increases the degree of automatic
stabilization of asymmetric shocks. This implies a reduction of the adjustment burden of national
fiscal policies in stabilizing the national economy when hit by an asymmetric shock. Therefore
the EFTS fosters the convergence of fiscal deficits. This feature is provided by (c).
Monetary and fiscal flexibility contribute to stabilize the average system when hit by
symmetric shocks. In that case the fiscal deficit and the EU money supply set by the ECB simply
mirror average output fluctuations: average deficits and money supply are set higher if initial
output is lower. A higher degree of fiscal flexibility reduces output fluctuations in the difference
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system, however at the cost of higher divergences in the fiscal deficit. The EFTS also enables
to stabilize output fluctuations in the difference systems induced by asymmetric shocks but
has an additional advantage of stabilizing the fluctuations in fiscal deficits in the difference
system.
5.4 Numerical Simulations: Symmetric and Asymmetric Shocks in the EMU
Having characterised the analytical solution of adjustment of the average and difference systems,
we turn to a simulation example to study the macroeconomic adjustment induced by symmetric
and asymmetric shocks that hit the EMU. A distinction is made between a regime (EMU 1)
without fiscal flexibility and without an EFTS (χ=0 andξ=0), a regime (EMU 2) with fiscal
flexibility but without an EFTS (χ=0.5 andξ=0) and finally a regime (EMU 3) without fiscal
flexibility but with an EFTS (χ=0 andξ=0.25). Monetary policy of the ECB is assumed not
to be influenced by considerations to stabilize output in any of the three regimes (ζ=0), as we
are not focusing on monetary policy in the EMU. Table 3 gives the structural and policy parameters
and the resulting initial equilibrium values of the simulation.
Table 3




































In the initial steady-state that results with this set of structural and policy parameters, all variables
are equal to zero:pA
c(t)=wA(t)=yA(t)=fA(t)=mA(t)=0 andpD
c(t)=wD(t)=yD(t)=fD(t)=n(t)=0.
Figure 3 shows the adjustment induced by a symmetric negative output shock of 1%
in the 2-country EMU at=0, i.e.υA(0)=−0.01.ρ takes the value of 0.1, implying that the shock
has considerable persistence. Average output in the EMU jumps down at the impact of the
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symmetric negative demand shock. The nominal wage jumps down to the level consistent with
long-run convergence to the new steady-state. After the initial decrease in output, output recovers
gradually due to the initial decline in real wages. In the second EMU regime, the stabilizing
force from fiscal policy also contributes to stabilization of output in the short run. The adjustment
of prices is very small in this example, reflecting the nominal rigidities in the economy: with
δ being equal to 0.33, contracts are renewed only every 3 year, causing a high inertia in the
prices. Wages and output adjust again to their long run equilibrium of zero which is approached
eventually. Monetary policy does not change of course, since we assumedmA andζ to be equal
to 0.
Because of our symmetry assumption, a symmetric shock has no impact on the difference
system. Therefore, outcomes under a regime with an EFTS but no fiscal flexibility (EMU 3)
equal outcomes under the EMU 1 regime without any macroeconomic stabilizers, if a symmetric
output shock hits EMU. The solid lines of the EMU 1 regime coincide, therefore, in all cases
with the dashed lines of the EMU 3 regime. Also we note that, because of the symmetries that
we have imposed, adjustment of macroeconomic variables in both country 1 and 2 is identical
to the adjustment in the average system as given in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Adjustment after a Symmetric Output Shock (υA(0)=−0.01,ρ=0.1)
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Figure 4 shows the adjustment induced by an asymmetric negative output shock of 1%
in the 2-country EMU, i.e.υD(0)=−0.01.ρ takes again a value of 0.1. Like in the average system,
the wage rate jumps down at the impact of the output shock and gradually recovers along the
saddle-point stable path. The decline in real wages contributes to the gradual recovery of output.
The output divergence in the EMU after an asymmetric shock can be stabilized by allowing
fiscal flexibility as in the EMU 2 regime, or by establishing an EFTS as in the EMU 3 regime
(or introducing both of course). Since we chooseχ=2ξ the effective degree of stabilization of
output differences is the same in both regimes. An asymmetric shock has no impact on the
average system. The dotted lines of the EMU 2 regime coincide, therefore, with the dashed
lines of the EMU 3 regime, except in case of the fiscal deficit and the EFTS. Because of the
symmetries that we have imposed and the definition of differences of variables, adjustment
of macroeconomic variables in country 1 identical to the adjustment in the difference system
in Figure 4, whereas adjustment in country 2 exactly mirrors adjustment in country 1: its economy
booms and wages jump upward rather than downward, in the EMU 2 regime it runs fiscal surplus
and in the EMU 3 regime it provide a fiscal transfer to country 1.
The EFTS regime not only features output stabilization but also has the additional advantage
that differences in national fiscal deficits are stabilized as compared to the regime with fiscal
flexibility only, which leads to divergence of fiscal deficits in the EMU. Since fiscal convergence
is stressed in the Maastricht criteria as a fundamental requirement to achieve nominal and real
convergence in the EMU, this seems to be characteristic of the EFTS to prefer such a transfer
system over fiscal flexibility if the EMU faces asymmetric shocks. As the demand shock dies
out gradually, the transfers through the EFTS also gradually decline.
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Figure 4
Adjustment after an Asymmetric Output Shock (υD(0)=−0.01,ρ=0.1)
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Conclusion
If the countries participating in the EMU do not constitute an optimal currency area, macroeconomic
performance in the EMU can be seriously affected if it is hit by symmetric and in particular
asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. This paper studied flexibility of national fiscal policies,
monetary policy of the ECB and a European Federal Transfer System (EFTS) as stabilizing
devices in an EMU hit by symmetric and asymmetric shocks, featuring nominal rigidities, low
labour mobility and little automatic stabilization from federal taxes and government spending.
The EFTS was defined as an intra-EMU business cycle stabilizing device and did not serve
in principle any redistributional or allocational purpose.
With the aid of an analytical model and simulation analysis, this paper showed how
fiscal flexibility stabilizes the output fluctuations induced by symmetric and asymmetric shocks.
The EFTS not only stabilizes output fluctuations induced by asymmetric shocks but also avoids
the divergence in fiscal deficits that fiscal flexibility creates during the adjustment phase. Therefore,
the EFTS contributes to fiscal convergence in the EMU. Fiscal convergence is seen by many
economists and politicians as a necessary prerequisite for long-run sustainability of the EMU
as witnesses the prominent place of the fiscal stringency criteria in the Maastricht Treaty.
Fiscal flexibility and/or the EFTS are able to substitute to a certain extent for the loss
of the asymmetric shock absorbing capacity of exchange rate adjustment that EMU implies.
The EFTS to some extent could replicate the degree of automatic stabilization of macroeconomic
shocks by federal transfers that is seen in more mature fiscal federations like the US. From
this perspective its implementation in an EMU that does not yet constitute an optimal currency
area and a mature fiscal federation, deserves serious political consideration.
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Appendix A Initial jump in wages
The {pi(t),wi(t)} systems that describe the dynamics of the average and difference system are linear dynamic systems
of the form,
The average and difference system display saddlepoint stability if the number of predetermined variables equals
(A.1)
the number of stable eigenvalues and the number of non-predetermined variables equals the number of unstable
eigenvalues (see e.g. Buiter (1984)). In both cases the price levelpi(t) is a predetermined variable whereas the
wage ratewi(t) is forward looking. A necessary and sufficient condition for both systems to display saddlepoint
stability is that the determinant ofAi is negative. Given the initial valuexi(0), the stable eigenvalue,hi, and the
steady state,xi(∞), the solution to (A.1) reads:
The steady-state of the system,xi(∞), is found by solving:
(A.2)
If the dynamic systems are saddlepoint stable, the forward looking variables, i.e.wi(t), will take unique
(A.3)
initial values,wi(0), such that the system is placed on its unique converging dynamic trajectory, given the initial
price levelpi(0). The initial value of the forward-looking variables,wi(0), is found by applying the method proposed
by Judd (1982):
- to find an analytical solution of the dynamic system, take the Laplace13 transformL[(.),s] of the dynamic system,
ẋ=Ax(t)+bi+υi(t):
- use the fact thatL[ẋi,s]= s.L[xi,s]-xi(0). Equating both expressions forL[ẋi,s] yields:
(A.4)
- impose the condition thatwi(0) adjusts in such a manner that saddlepoint stability of the dynamic system is ensured,
(A.5)
given the initial price level,pi(0). This implies thatL[bi,zi]+L[υi,zi]+xi(0)=0, wheres=zi with zi being the unstable
eigenvalue ofAi. Imposing this convergence requirement gives the unique initial wage rate,wi(0), consistent with
long-run convergence of the dynamic system to its steady-state. If we assume e.g. that the exogenous shock decays
exponentially, i.e. ,xi(0) is found easily since the Laplace transform of the constantbi is defined
asbi/zi and the Laplace transform of the exponentially dying impulseυi(t) asυi(0)/(zi+ρi).
13 The Laplace transform off(t), F(s) is defined as: .
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I The Average System
The average system is given by:
The inverse of the matrixAA equals:
(A.6)
with ∆A≡1+γ(κ+ζ)/λ−σ+ηχ.The determinant ofAA, |AA|, which equals −δ2νγ/λ∆A, is equal to the product of the
(A.7)
eigenvalues. A necessary and sufficient condition for the average system to display saddlepoint stability, therefore,
is that∆A>0. The eigenvalues of the average system equal:
To determine the initial state of the average system, take the Laplace transform of (A.6) and use (A.5) to write
(A.8)
where . TakingzA for s and using the Laplace transforms for a constant and
(A.9)
an exponentially decaying impulse, implying the convergence condition
requires
for a solution to (A.6) to remain bounded.
(A.10)
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I The Difference System
The difference system is given by:
(A.11)
The inverse of the matrixAD equals:
with ∆D≡1+σ+η(χ+2ξ).The determinant ofAD, |AD|, which equals −δ2ν2α/∆D, is equal to the product of the eigenvalues.
(A.12)
The necessary and sufficient condition for the difference system to display saddlepoint stability, |AD| < 0, therefore,
is satisfied in all cases. The eigenvalues of the difference system equal:
To determine the initial state of the difference system, take the Laplace transform of (A.11) and use (A.5) to write,
(A.13)
(A.14)
where . TakingzD for sand using the Laplace transforms for a constant and an exponentially
decaying impulse, the convergence condition requires that
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